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This article explores the evolution of the official Russian discourse on Chechnya during two major 
recent terrorist acts: the Dubrovka Theatre crisis in Moscow (2002), and the Beslan school siege 
(2004). By tracing the changes in the official image of the ‘threat’, this article challenges the 
assumption that this discourse has remained constant in the last few years. Instead, it characterises 
the dynamic of change at times of terrorist acts and beyond as an ongoing attempt by Russian 
officials to remove the Chechen issue from the political agenda, which precludes a real dialogue 
about or solution to the ongoing Chechen crisis. 
 
High profile terrorist acts in Russia have punctuated Russo – Chechen 
relations in recent years. A number of analyses of these acts have already been 
produced, with regards to the political and crisis management aspects of the 
development of the Russo – Chechen relations (Alexseev 2002; Stepanova 2004; 
Dolnik & Pilch 2003; Lynch 2005). However, less work has been published on the 
presentation of these events in the Russian official media. Since official political 
commentary on the subject of Chechnya has been curtailed since 1999, media analyses 
of such events have in themselves become important information sources and at times 
key turning points in Russian governmental discourse on Chechnya and terrorism in 
Russia. 
 
This article explores the evolution of the official Russian discourse on Chechnya 
between 2002 and 2004. By tracing the changes in the official image of the ‘threat’, the 
assumption that this discourse has remained constant in recent years is challenged. 
Rather, it is argued, there has been an ongoing attempt by Russian officials to remove 
the Chechen issue from the political agenda, and to preclude a real dialogue about or 
solution to the ongoing Chechen crisis. Two case studies have been especially selected 
for comparison: the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre hostage taking during a performance 
of the musical Nord-Ost (2002) and the Beslan school siege (2004). These were chosen 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, these two events were significant both for the national 
and political consciousness in Russia. Secondly, although coverage of Chechnya in the 
official media has decreased significantly in recent years, this was not the case during 
these two events. The occurrence of such terrorist acts meant that the authorities 
had to present their interpretation of events, defend their policies both in the region 
and in general, and explain how and why these two events could take place. Thus, a 
large amount of official material appeared in the Russian press, facilitating an 
extensive analysis of the two events and the broader official Russian discourse in this 
period. 
 
The aim here is to examine the presentation of the ‘threat’ during these two acts of 
terrorism in the Russian official media and shed light on the official discourse on 
Chechnya between 2002 and 2004. The term ‘threat’ here is used to consider ways in 
which Russian official discourse defined the source of terrorism in Russia. Some of the 
key questions, which this official discourse tried to tackle, were: who had committed 
such acts, and why; what this meant for Russian security; and how Russia should try 
to deal with the perpetrators of acts of terrorism. 
 
Russian official discourse on Chechnya since 1999 has often been characterised in 
relation to the language of the war on terror. However, this approach presents a much 
too static image of this discourse. As will be argued below, by 2002 Russia had entered 
a new phase in its relations with Chechnya and had begun to advocate a policy of 
normalisation in the region (which argued that the situation in Chechnya was 
returning to normal and large-scale fighting had ceased). Simultaneously, on the 
discursive level the Chechen issue was being actively removed from the political 
agenda as the source and reason for the ongoing occurrence of terrorist acts on 
Russian territory. This was an important shift in the discourse, which continued in 
2004. Moreover, shifts in the official discourse during these two terrorist acts also 
occurred as a result of an attempt to deflect repeated criticisms of the official position 
and official conduct during the attacks. A close analysis of the reports from 
Rossiiskaya gazeta suggests that the image of the ‘threat’ shifted from being centred on 
Chechnya to a diffused, less clearly defined danger emanating from international 
Islamic terrorists targeting the whole of the North Caucasus and threatening the very 
existence of the Russian Federation. However, solutions for resolving this ‘threat’ did 
not appear to have moved at the same rate as the remodelling of the discourse on this 
‘threat’ in the official Russian media. 
 
First, a brief background to Russo – Chechen relations will be provided, followed by 
an outline of the two terror attacks. I then examine the different aspects of the image 
of the ‘threat’, such as the nature of the ‘threat’, its location, the magnitude of this 
danger and the solutions offered to curtail it. The sources for this study have primarily 
been the main state newspaper, Rossiiskaya gazeta and official speeches reproduced in 
other media sources. Although Rossiiskaya gazeta is the official newspaper of the Russian 
government, it remains a part of the free press and may deviate from the official line; therefore I 
indicate whether an opinion is expressed by a commentator from Rossiiskaya gazeta or by a Russian 
official. 
 
Background: a brief history of Russian – Chechen relations 
 
Unlike some of its neighbours, Chechnya, as a Muslim region situated in the North 
Caucasus, has traditionally resisted assimilation into the Russian empire since the 
eighteenth century. In 1991, as the USSR was collapsing, Chechnya declared its 
independence from Russia. The current conflict began in 1994 and has continued 
since, with a brief respite between 1996 and 1999. Since 2001 the Russian government 
has argued that large-scale fighting has ceased in this region, and it has begun its policy 
of ‘normalisation’ in Chechnya, aiming to transfer administrative control to the 
Chechens. However, hostilities have continued since then, although some debate has 
emerged in the last few years as to whether or not this can still be called a war, because 
organised fighting has decreased to a significant degree since 2005/06. 
 
Chechnya is a highly mythologised region in traditional Russian imagination. This 
stems to a large extent from the writings of nineteenth-century Russian poets and 
novelists, who presented Chechnya in a romanticised way, portraying the Chechen 
people both as lone and noble fighters, and as ‘savages’ (Trenin et al. 2004, p. 65). 
Since 1991 the rise in racial prejudice in Russia has led to a renewal of this racialisation 
of the Caucasus, described as the ‘other’ in the official press (Roman 2002, p. 31). The 
re-start of the conflict in 1999 was furthermore portrayed as an anti-terrorist 
operation, rather than a secessionist conflict (as had been the case with the first conflict 
in 1994 – 96), and this added another dimension to the official Russian discourse about 
this region. In 2001 the blurring of Chechnya and terrorism into a single phenomenon 
reached a new level when President Putin aligned Russia with the American-led war on 
terror following the 9/11 attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. Putin noted that 
What happened today underlines one more time the importance of the Russian proposal to 
unite international forces in the fight against terrorism. That is the plague of the twenty-first 
century. Russia directly knows what terrorism is and for that reason we understand the 
feelings of the American people. (Mereu 2001) 
 
This move merged Russia’s domestic problems of Chechnya and terrorism with the 
worldwide phenomenon of the war on terror, thus shifting the focus by moving the 
nature of the threat to Russian security away from the specific context of Chechnya. 
From this point on, all terrorist actions in Russia were presented in the official media 
through the prism of the language of the war on terror. 
 
At the same time as Chechnya was being equated more and more with problems of 
international terrorism, the media coverage of developments within the republic and 
the North Caucasus in general has been severely curtailed since 1999. This was partly 
due to increasing state control over the reporting of this conflict, primarily on 
television, but also because the region had become very dangerous for reporters. 
 
Furthermore, as Oates and White (2003) argue, a general ‘Chechen fatigue’ had set in 
among the Russian public, whose interest in this issue had significantly dwindled since 
the first conflict. As a result, little information has been coming through about events 
on the ground in Chechnya, and the official position has come to dominate, especially 
on television and in certain newspapers, such as Rossiiskaya gazeta. Many journalists 
who reported on the first Chechen war have since changed focus and prefer to distance 
themselves from their past involvement with the region. Only a few newspapers, such 
as Novaya gazeta, and journalists like Andrei Babitsky and Anna Politkovskaya, 
continued to report regularly about events in Chechnya. However, these were isolated 
pockets of information, and print media in general have seen a significant drop in 
readership after 1991, with most people receiving their information from television. 
 
The two chosen case studies have been covered in detail on Radio Liberty and a 
brief outline of the events will suffice here. The Moscow Dubrovka Theatre siege 
began on 23 October 2002, when 53 armed men and women seized the theatre during a 
performance of the first Russian musical Nord-Ost. This siege with 979 hostages lasted 
58 hours and ended with the death of 128 hostages, largely during the rescue on 26 
October (Dolnik & Pilch 2003, p. 581). The storming of the building by Russian 
special counter-terrorism forces and the controversial use of a gas, which overwhelmed 
both terrorists and hostages, became a contentious issue in the aftermath of the rescue. 
The Beslan school siege unfolded far away from Moscow in a small town in North 
Ossetia. The major differences between the two attacks were that Beslan was part of a 
wider terrorist campaign in August and September 2004,4 and that the target was a 
school, involving large numbers of children.5 On 1 September 2004, 38 armed rebels 
entered School Number One during an assembly celebrating the new academic year. 
The militants held 1,200 hostages, including teachers, pupils, parents, siblings, 
relatives and friends, in a small school gymnasium, and mined the school building. On 
3 September, Special Forces stormed the building after a bomb appeared to have 
exploded inside and hostages had begun to escape through a hole in the building. In 
total 300 people died, half of them children; 200 were missing, and many more were 
wounded. Both of these terrorist acts came to be seen as great tragedies in recent 
Russian history. 
 
The presentation of the threat in the official Russian media 
 
One of the major themes of the second Chechen conflict has been the government’s 
attempt to portray it as an anti-terrorist operation in which the federal forces were 
fighting the threat of international Islamic terrorism rather than secessionism. This 
was the overarching conceptual prism through which most of the current events in Chechnya and 




The fusion between international Islamic terrorist movements, Russia’s domestic 
problems in Chechnya and terrorism into a ‘single phenomenon’ (Trenin et al. 2004, 
p. 79) can be found not only in the official media but also at the highest political levels. 
For example in 2004, Yuri Tchaika, the Russian Justice Minister, characterised this 
threat as an ‘invisible threat without borders’ (Yamshanov 2004). The influence of this 
danger on the regional situation was emphasised, particularly when on 14 September 
2004 Rossiiskaya gazeta reported Putin as saying that it was in the North Caucasus 
‘that ideologists of international terrorism are particularly active’. This suggested that 
the source of the terrorist threat was external and that Chechnya and the North 
Caucasus were used as nothing more than bases from which foreign terrorists could 
operate and destabilise the rest of Russia. This was also implied when Rossiiskaya 
gazeta wrote that terrorism in Russia ‘is linked with the worldwide terrorist Islamic 
movement . . . and Chechen separatists are nothing more than errand boys for them’ 
(Zakatnova 2004). Therefore, it was international terrorism and not Chechnya or the 
North Caucasus that was portrayed as the main source of the ‘threat’. 
 
The official discourse also highlighted the involvement of fundamentalist Muslims in 
terrorist acts, re-emphasising the now-familiar discourse of Islamic fundamentalism 
operating in Russia as elsewhere. In 2002 the specific focus on the ‘black widows’ 
(female terrorists) involved in hostage taking seemed to draw similarities between 
events in Chechnya and the phenomenon of Islamic suicide bombers in Palestine 
(Russell 2005a, p. 112). In this respect, two points are worth noting. First, the media’s 
emphasis on the external appearance of Islam, such as long descriptions of the Islamic 
dress of the ‘black widows’ in 2002, or the beards of the male terrorists, betrayed the 
lack of any in-depth consideration of the nature of Islamic belief in Chechnya or the 
North Caucasus. Second, most of the debate on Islam focused on macro-level global 
developments, such as the perceived ‘clash of civilisations’ in the modern world, 
between the progressive modernity of the ‘civilised’ world and the ‘terrorists, slave 
traders, figures with medieval morals and medieval lifestyles’ and ‘backward’ Islamic 
world (Tretyakov 2004). This, it was claimed, was a fundamental clash, which could 
only be resolved by one side winning this battle. Rossiiskaya gazeta went on to suggest 
that the aim of these Islamic terrorists was ‘to make their own type of Islam as the one 
and only religion in the world’ (Radzhikhovsky 2004). Whilst certain Islamic leaders in 
Chechnya may have seen the Russo – Chechen conflict in such religious terms, the 
demands of the terrorists themselves during these events in fact consistently focused on 
the removal of Russian troops from Chechnya.6 The secular nature of the terrorist 
demands was often ignored in the official media. Instead, their Islamic beliefs were 
emphasised. For example, Kozlova and Sharov emphasised in Rossiiskaya gazeta in 
October 2004 that what is mainly known about these terrorists is that ‘these are serious 
Wahhabists’ (Kozlova & Sharov 2002). 
 
The actual extent of involvement of international terrorists in Chechnya is a 
contentious issue, and Stuart Horsman suggests that one should not over-emphasise 
such links (2005, p. 203). Wilhelmson argues that the Russian authorities tried to 
consistently portray the Chechen conflict as part of increasing world-wide Islamisation, 
whereas in fact the source of instability and friction in relation to Chechnya 
remained domestic rather than international (Wilhelmsen 2005, p. 48). Independent 
newspapers continued to focus on the local sources of instability for Russia. 
Malashenko (2002), in Vremya, characterised the interaction between Chechnya and 
radical Islam as ‘seeds [that] fell on fertile ground’, and argued that the core of the 
instability and problems in that region were local and due to the previous Chechen war 
and secessionism rather than part of international Islamic movements. However, no 
such discussions were present in the official media. Perhaps this would have been 
politically problematic, and could have undermined the state’s policy of Chechenisation. 
This policy, it was hoped in 2002 and even in 2004, would stabilise the situation 
in Chechnya by handing over the running of local affairs to pro-Russian Chechen 
groups. According to the official position, this should have reduced the ‘threat’ to 
Russia’s security. However, although at the time of writing Chechnya is now under the 
command of the Chechen authorities, most notably Ramzan Kadyrov, the situation 
on the ground is still far from stable, as shown in the report by the Russian based 
NGO Memorial. 
 
Presenting terrorism as a homogeneous ‘threat’ allowed the official discourse to 
associate the previous, and now awkward, Chechen administration (which had been 
democratically elected by the Chechen people in 1997, but which had gone into 
opposition since the resumption of hostilities in 1999) with the idea of an international 
terrorist threat. The attempt to de-legitimise the head of that administration, Aslan 
Maskhadov, was obvious when Yuri Bogomolov wrote in Rossiiskaya gazeta on 16 
September 2004, that ‘war is ongoing for the political survival of Maskhadov and 
Basaev’. This quashed any suggestion that the previous administration had been 
fighting for higher moral or national reasons, such as the Chechen people or 
independence. The media also tried to use the Nord-Ost and Beslan incidents to 
counteract the repeated suggestion in certain domestic and international circles that 
Russia should negotiate with Maskhadov. As noted by Bogomolov in the same article, 
‘what is today happening in the Caucasus is not a national-liberation war, because its 
ideals are buried under the victims of war’. This comment also fell in line with the 
official and consistent position of Putin’s administration since 1999 not to negotiate 
with terrorists and refuse to accept the second Chechen conflict as a war of 
independence. Thus the official media not only maintained their firm line that there 
would be no negotiations with terrorists, but also re-enforced this position by 
attempting to de-legitimise Maskhadov’s government, the obvious potential bloc with 
which the Russians could negotiate at the time. 
 
Crucially this image of the threat as a homogeneous force did not differentiate 
between different motivations for opposition to Russia’s policy in Chechnya or the 
North Caucasus. All opponents were presented as terrorists. By contrast, Lord Judd,9 
in his report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), 
identified three distinct groups with different aims: Al Qaeda extremists committed to 
jihad; opportunistic criminals with vested material interests in the war; and political 
leaders who, although misguided, justifiably desired a secure political and cultural 
identity for Chechens, whom they saw as humiliated and oppressed (Blandy 2003, 
p. 48). Commentators in other newspapers also highlighted the importance of local 
issues. For example, Patrick Cockburn in Novaya gazeta, argued that it was 
‘precisely the cruelty of the Russian occupation, and not the link between the fighters 
and Al Qaeda which maintains this rebellion’, suggesting that fighters were largely 
motivated by the actions of the Russian troops on the ground rather than 
international terrorism. Another important theme in the independent media was the 
extent to which instability in Chechnya, and therefore in Russia, was the result of 
corruption and shady business dealings on all sides. Thus, for example, Semen 
Novoprudsky (2004) wrote that this conflict had turned into a ‘business’, involving not 
only terrorists, but many important people. The opposition media was also more open 
to the possibility of negotiations with the Chechens, especially Maskhadov, as a way 
to resolve tensions between Russia and Chechnya. For example, Yuri Ryzhov 
suggested in Novaya gazeta that the way to prevent such tragedies from re-occurring 
was to ‘negotiate with that legitimate part of Chechen leadership with which it is still 
possible to do so’ (Gordienko 2002). 
 
No discussion of the local situation in Chechnya, the effect the Russian operations 
had on the local populations, the problems with all-round corruption or the possibility 
to negotiate with the Chechen leadership were seen in the official media. Russell 
presents this as an ‘apparent paradox’ in Russia’s war on terror, which enabled Russia 
to label its opponents as terrorists, whilst continuing its own special operations on the 
ground. He argues that such ‘wars’, against terrorism, crime, or poverty, follow 
different rules to normal warfare. Classifying the target as a societal problem, rather 
than a geographical entity, allowed the state to choose who was a terrorist, and bypass 
traditional rules of warfare that are obligatory on both sides in territorial conflicts 
(Russell 2005b, p. 240). 
 
The spatial shift of the locus of the threat 
 
Although the overarching presentation of the threat during Dubrovka and Beslan was 
international Islamic terrorism and this had remained consistent between 2002 and 
2004, the specifics of what made up this ‘threat’ shifted considerably in this same 
period. Primarily the key change was the spatial locus of this threat, shifting from 
Chechnya between 1999 and 2003 to the entire North Caucasus by 2004. Increasing 
instability in the North Caucasus, at times related to Islamic groups, has of course, 
been well documented in the last few years. A series of incidences and raids across the 
North Caucasus occurred during President Putin’s second term in office, such as the 
Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, raids in October 2005,11 and smaller clashes between 
federal forces and alleged Islamic fighters even outside the North Caucasus region 
such as in Stavropol Krai in February 2006.12 The change in rhetoric, although partly 
a reflection of the changing realities on the ground, was also part of the broader trend 
of removing Chechnya from the political agenda, especially during another terrorist 
attack. 
 
In 2002 President Putin still talked about the problem in Chechnya, stating that 
‘they [the terrorists] and those who stand behind them, are precisely scared of the 
future . . . stabilisation in the Chechen republic’ (Ptichkin 2002). In the same vein the 
discourse isolating the ‘bad’ Chechen ‘fighters’ from the ‘good’, ‘ordinary’ Chechens, 
who were prepared to collaborate with Russia, was widely seen in Rossiiskaya gazeta 
in 2002 (Sharov 2002). This presented Chechnya both as a place used by foreign 
terrorists to destabilise both the region and the country as a whole, and as a source of 
danger due to those Chechens who had allied themselves with foreign fighters. This 
appeared to create tension in the official discourse about the nature of the ‘threat’. 
Although overall, international terrorists were presented as the source of the threat, 
extensive discussions about Chechnya as the location of the threat appeared to suggest 
that it was, in fact, Chechnya that was the source of the danger. 
 
However, by 2004 the focus of the official press discussion had shifted to ‘the 
situation in the North Caucasus’13 rather than Chechnya, and most of the instability in 
the discourse had disappeared. Whilst the image of the North Caucasus as a victim of 
terror and a base of terror was being created, Chechnya effectively disappeared from 
the discursive lexicon. Whereas after the Dubrovka siege President Putin personally 
took part in public and publicised meetings with Chechen representatives and 
delegates,14 no such meetings were organised after the Beslan siege. In fact, Sergei 
Lavrov acknowledged this change in an interview with foreign journalists after the 
Beslan siege, noting that: ‘as to the criminals, neither the President Vladimir Putin, nor 
other officials, said it was an attack by Chechens’ (Lavrov 2004). 
 
The removal of Chechnya from the official discourse during the Beslan siege could 
be seen in the speeches delivered by the president. In his October 2002 address to the 
governing parliament faction, President Putin highlighted the importance of continued 
stabilisation of Chechnya, stating that ‘despite all the pain which we are experiencing 
in Chechnya, nevertheless stabilisation is taking place’.15 By contrast, in his speech at 
the enlarged government meeting with the government and the heads of the regions in 
September 2004, Putin’s focus was on the North Caucasus, when he stated that ‘in my 
address to the people on 4 September, I also spoke of the necessity of increasing 
security in the North Caucasus. . . As you know, the socio-economic situation in the 
North Caucasus region is deplorable’.16 Crucially, in the same speech Chechnya is 
referred to alongside other North Caucasus republics: ‘In republics such as Ingushetia, 
Chechnya and Dagestan, it [unemployment] is a truly mass phenomenon. The average 
monthly income in the South Federal district is one and a half times lower than the 
average for Russia’.17 Chechnya therefore was no longer presented as a special case in 
Russian politics, but just another part of the North Caucasus. No further reference 
was made to the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Chechens or the specific situation in that republic. 
Instead, the North Caucasus became the place that was being used by international 
terrorists to destabilise Russia. This was not because of any politically motivated 
factors on the part of the local population, but because of its poor economic situation, 
which foreign groups were exploiting. As President Putin stressed in September 2004, 
such socio-economic problems have led to the North Caucasus becoming ‘rich soil for 
extremist propaganda’.18 The issue of Chechen independence, secession and political 
demands had in turn been resolved in the official media by simply not being mentioned 
in 2004. 
 
Crucially, the opposition discourse did not witness the same shift, and generally 
continued to identify Chechnya as the source, and not just the location, of instability. 
For example, writing in Vremya Novostei, Semen Novoprudsky (2004) discussed the 
roots of the ‘Chechen’, not ‘North Caucasian’, conflict. Some opposition media in 
2004 actually blamed President Putin for failing to fulfil his promise to keep Russia 
safe and resolve the Chechen issue. Ryzhkov, a liberal member of the Duma, was 
quoted in Nezavisimaya gazeta as arguing that ‘the president was given a contract to 
keep order in the country and to safeguard people’s security. Now we see that this 
contract has been violated’ (Ryzhkov 2004). Ryzhkov also rejected the discourse on 
international terrorism suggesting that ‘this is an utterly lame excuse and cannot be 
taken seriously’ and questioned whether the president would fundamentally alter his 
policy on Chechnya. Thus Chechnya continued to play a key political role in the 
discourse of the independent media in 2004. 
 
Although on the discursive level there was a continued referral to the problems in 
the North Caucasus rather than Chechnya, on the policy level the Russian response to 
the situation in Chechnya continued to be markedly different from that in the North 
Caucasus. In 2004, sweeping operations targeting insurgents, ‘Islamic terrorists’, and 
their sympathisers, as well as travel restrictions, were still primarily being deployed in 
Chechnya only, and not in the rest of the North Caucasus. Although the epicentre of 
operations on both the insurgents and the federal forces widened by 2005 and 2006, 
this was not yet the case in 2004. Thus this change in rhetoric is perhaps best 
characterised as a government attempt to remove from the political agenda Chechnya 
as a problem it had failed to resolve, rather than acknowledging the changing realities 
in the North Caucasus. 
 
The level of the threat 
 
The level of the ‘threat’ to Russia, as presented in the official media, also increased 
exponentially between 2002 and 2004, suggesting either that the official presentation of 
the threat continued to evolve with the changing circumstances and events on the 
ground, or that the official media was trying to portray this ‘threat’ as a new 
phenomenon. However, no mention was made in the official press that the Russian 
authorities or the presidency were in any way to blame for the occurrence of the two 
terrorist attacks or that the Russian state had failed to resolve the Chechen issue as 
promised in 1999. 
 
In 2002, Rossiiskaya gazeta still presented the threat as a manageable and 
surmountable danger, even if such terrorism was said to be ‘becoming more arrogant 
and cruel’ (Vorob’ev 2002). The aims of these terrorists were portrayed as very specific, 
for example to get attention for their cause among the international community. This 
was the view suggested by the Deputy Chair of the Council of Ministers of ChechenoIngushetia, 
Lema Kasaev, who was quoted in Rossiiskaya gazeta as saying that ‘the 
terrorists are, above all, trying to create more external impact, they are not working 
for Russia, but mainly for the international community’ (Sharov 2002). The refusal to 
concede to terrorist demands, unlike during the 1995 and 1996 terrorist acts,19 was 
above all presented as a major victory for the Russian government. In October 2002 
Rossiiskaya gazeta quoted Kichin as saying that the Dubrovka Theatre crisis was 
meant to become Russia’s new Stalingrad, 
 
when a self-confident and arrogant enemy understood for the first time its defeat and Russia 
could once again feel pride in itself and its people . . . Today for the first time in recent time, we 
felt a sense of pride for our country and our people. (Vorob’ev 2002) 
 
This sense of triumphalism was repeated again and again in the official press for some 
weeks after the end of the siege. On 31 October 2002 Senator Vladimir Kulakov was 
quoted in an interview with Rossiiskaya gazeta in support of the actions of the special 
forces during the siege, noting that ‘of course one of the main aims of the terrorists was 
to humiliate Russia. Those who were involved in the rescue operation did not let 
international terrorism bring Russia to its knees’ (Babakin 2002). In this way the 
19In June 1995 Chechen insurgents took hundreds of hostages in a small town of Budennovsk in 
southern Russia. Over 100 people died during the rescue operation. A similar incident took place six 
months later in Dagestani city of Kizlyar in January 1996. This time, Chechen rebels under the 
command of Salman Raduyev took 3,000 people hostage in a local hospital. 
 
A particularly important feature of the official media in 2002 was the attempt to 
counteract the widespread criticism in the independent media about how the state 
chose to deal with this threat during acts of terrorism. The main thrust of criticism 
concerned the actions of the officials during the rescue operation. Pankov and Vershov 
(2002) argued in Vremya Novostei that the storming was not triggered by the actions of 
the terrorists, as had been suggested by the authorities, but had been planned well in 
advance, as was the use of the gas; they characterised the rescue operation as a 
‘tragedy’ and not a success from the point of view of the hostages.20 Valeri Yakov in 
Novye Izvestiya also characterised this moment as one when the authorities took 
‘revenge on everyone, terrorists and hostages’, and asks why the authorities did not 
create the necessary facilities for administering the antidote to the rescued hostages 
once the gas had been used (Yakov 2002). 
 
An acknowledgment and response to such critics was given in the official media 
which argued that the officials had acted professionally and that the terrorist threat 
had been dealt with successfully during the Dubrovka crisis (Yamshanov 2002; 
Sel’tsovsky 2002). Rather than offering articles by its own journalists, Rossiiskaya 
gazeta focused instead on substantiating the official position by featuring a large 
number of interviews with experts in order to justify the use of the gas. Experts, such 
as the assistant deputy of the Ministry of Health, Alexander Zharov, or the director of 
the Moscow Health service, Andrei Sel’tsovsky, presented detailed, often scientifically 
led explanations to justify state actions (Krasnopolskaya 2002). In Rossiiskaya gazeta, 
Sel’tsovsky supported the official line by noting that the authorities looked at ‘every 
possible way to minimise casualties’ and suggested that the high number of casualties 
was not the fault of the special services but because ‘you have to take into account that 
by that point there were no healthy people in the hall’. The blame for the large number 
of victims was therefore put firmly on the terrorists, the conditions in which hostages 
had been held and their poor health, thus diverting attention away from the actions of 
the authorities and trying to neutralise criticism expressed in other media. Rossiiskaya 
gazeta provided far less space for interviews with hostages and their relatives than 
other newspapers, because, as shown by those published in Kommersant, these often 
contradicted the official line (Allenova et al. 2004). In this way, the official narrative, 
through the medium of newspapers like Rossiiskaya gazeta, became involved in a 
contest to assert its presentation of events against mounting criticism in the 
independent media. 
 
However, the recurrence of a terrorist attack on such a large scale in 2004 shattered 
any mood of optimism in the official Russian press about the possibility of defeating 
this danger in the near future. In 2004 President Putin was quoted in Rossiiskaya 
gazeta as saying that this danger was a war which ‘do[es] not end quickly’ (Yamshanov 
2004). Whereas in 2002 the threat was still presented as localised and manageable, by 
2004 it was perceived as much larger and all-engulfing. Rossiiskaya gazeta reported 
that ‘those who carry out terrorist acts want the disintegration of Russia’. 
 
However, as Coalson (2004) astutely notes, the change in rhetoric in 2004 was perhaps not only a 
reflection of the actual growing and widening instability on the ground (now including 
most of the North Caucasus), but primarily a way for the Russian government to 
deflect the blame for failing to prevent terrorist attacks by presenting the threat and 
groups organising such attacks as so dangerous, monumental and new that they could 
not be dealt with immediately. Indeed, by 2004 even the Russian public seemed to 
share this particular interpretation of the danger faced by Russia. Opinion polls in 
September 2004 indicated that most people expected such attacks to continue 
(Konygina 2004). Thus, according to official discourse, by 2004 the threat had grown 
both in terms of its location, it source and its size. However, such shifts cannot be seen 
in the policies that the Russian government proposed in order to tackle the threat. 
 
Measures proposed to tackle this ‘threat’ 
 
Bhatia (2005, p. 17) argues that the discourse of the war on terror presents terrorist 
attacks as ‘a matter of a pure ‘‘evil’’, with no history or reason’, which one cannot 
negotiate with. This was essentially the position taken by the Russian official discourse 
in 2002 and 2004. Any concessions to the terrorists, both during the terrorist attacks 
and in general, such as a withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, would, 
according to Tretyakov, led to a terrorist takeover of the entire North Caucasus, the 
collapse of Russia and the triumph of violence and death (Tretyakov 2002). Halbach 
(2002, p. 6) suggests that the treaty of Khassavjurt, ending the first Chechen war, was 
regarded as treason by certain groups of the Russian elite, and should not be repeated. 
As noted earlier, the issue of negotiations also became contentious in the Russian and 
Western press, and the government used particularly emotive and defensive language 
to reinforce its position. For example, Yuri Ushakov (2004), the Russian Ambassador 
to the US, wrote in The Washington Post that ‘child-killers come closer to Osama Bin 
Laden . . . It is unimaginable that any US administration would ever negotiate with Al 
Qaeda’. 
 
The solutions offered to overcome this danger on the ground were both domestic 
and international. Whereas the image of the threat evolved between 2002 and 2004, the 
thinking behind how to deal with it in practice remained the same. Domestically, the 
focus was on finding a political solution for regional socio-economic problems, which 
were said to be making Chechnya and the North Caucasus fertile ground for 
international terrorism. In 2002, the official discourse still championed the 
Chechenisation programme. According to Borisov, ‘if Chechens feel that they are 
really returning to rebuild houses, that conditions are being created for peaceful work, 
then the stream of those who want to go to the mountains [i.e. join the terrorists] will 
dry out’ (Borisov 2002). The state proposed extending this programme by holding a 
referendum on a new Chechen constitution, fresh presidential elections, and 
implementing Russian laws in Chechnya. In 2004 the focus moved towards bringing 
in key political figures from outside. This took the form of a Special Federal 
Commission on the North Caucasus, led by the new plenipotentiary envoy to the 
Southern Federal District, Dmitri Kozak; the re-establishment of the Ministry for 
Regions and Ethnicity; and the launch of an integrated security system in the region 
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The aim was to improve the socio-economic 
situation in the whole of the North Caucasus. 
 
Despite changes in rhetoric and emphasis, both of these measures had been tried in 
the past and had not succeeded. Already by 2002, Russia’s reconstruction policy in 
Chechnya had largely failed. Chechnya continued to suffer from an unemployment 
rate of 80%, and 80% of housing had been destroyed during the fighting and had not 
been rebuilt. Halbach (2002, p. 4) argues that the Russian authorities lacked the 
necessary local support for policies to succeed. Nor was this achieved by 2004, as the 
assassinations of the Chechen President Kadyrov in 2004 and subsequent acts of 
terrorism in Moscow and elsewhere showed. Dov Lynch (2005, pp. 159 – 60) also 
notes that most of the sub-parts of the post-Beslan plan had been tried previously and 
failed. 
 
Vitally, the continuous omission of some of the aspects of this conflict from official 
discourse has hampered efforts to find a workable solution. First, neither in 2002 or 
2004 did the government address the issue of the Russian ‘sweeping’ operations in 
Chechnya, such as Alkhan Kala in June 2001 or Semovodsk in July 2001, or the 
trauma associated with these for local populations (Human Rights Watch 2002, 
pp. 13 – 46). Secondly, governmental discourse overlooked the war’s effect on the new 
generation in Chechnya. According to Aslambek Aslakhanov, Duma Deputy for 
Chechnya, the young people in Chechnya ‘grew up under the rule that whoever has the 
greatest number of guns and armed people behind him is right. They live under their 
own traditions and customs’ (Feifer 2002), and were now actively participating in 
terrorist attacks against Russia. It was this lack of careful analysis of developments on 
the ground which resulted in the persistent failure of the Russian policy in Chechnya 
and the North Caucasus. 
 
Internationally, after each terrorist attack the official media commended the state’s 
measures. The Dubrovka and Beslan crises were also used in an attempt to alleviate 
Western criticism of Russian actions and to show to the Russian people (and possible 
domestic opposition) that the state’s actions were supported by the West. In this way, 
foreign charitable collections and letters of support played a prominent role in 
domestic news coverage of the Beslan and Dubrovka attacks in Rossiiskaya gazeta 
(Makarichev 2002; Sorokina 2004). However, because there was no fundamental shift 
in the Western position towards Russia on the issue of Chechnya, this feeling of 
solidarity, so prominent in the initial coverage of the two terrorist attacks, petered out 
after that. Subsequent commentaries about Western and Russian attempts to eradicate 
international terrorism highlighted the negative and insufficient role played by 
the West in the global fight against terrorism. Rossiiskaya gazeta characterised Russia 
as a vital link in the fight against terrorism and in the protection of Western 
civilisation, and argued that Russia should be helped by its Western allies to prevent 
the spread of terrorism to other countries (Radzhikhovsky 2004). By 2004 Russian 
official media no longer seem to portray the West in a positive light with regard to the 
fight against terrorism. The West was still seen as a potential ally, who should 
understand the situation in Russia and do its duty by helping Russia in fighting this 




The presentation of the threat to Russian security from the terrorists underwent a 
substantial transformation between 2002 and 2004. Whilst the links between Islamic 
international terrorism and Chechnya continued to dominate much of the coverage of 
the Beslan crisis in 2004, the focus of the official media was no longer on Chechnya, 
but had shifted onto the North Caucasus, and the level of this threat had also 
significantly risen by 2004. Evidence suggests that, whilst in 2002 the terrorist threat 
was still largely presented in the official press as a discreet and manageable problem, 
largely connected with developments within Chechnya, by 2004 it was presented as a 
much greater threat, possibly threatening the very existence of Russia, or even the 
‘civilised’ world. 
 
At this stage, one would suggest that this change in discourse was only in part due to 
the Russian government and the official press responding to the apparent increase in 
instability and growing unrest in the whole of the North Caucasus, which was no 
longer confined to Chechnya. Crucially, it was also an attempt to retain legitimacy in 
the face of ongoing terrorist attacks in the heart of Russia, and to explain away the 
state’s failure to resolve the Chechen crisis sooner. By presenting the terrorist threat as 
part of a new, much larger and more endemic danger in the modern world, the official 
press seemed keen on supporting the government’s actions both during and after the 
Beslan crisis in September 2004. 
 
In the official media, the discussion of the Chechen issue was dominated by the 
attempt to frame the terrorist threat in terms of ‘a clash of civilisations’. This suggests 
a zero-sum-game approach to the Chechen issue on the part of the official press and 
Russian officials, and may go some way to explain their continuous refusal to establish 
any negotiations with the rebels. Although, since 2004, the Russian government has 
promoted more actively the concepts of ‘Chechenisation’, normalisation and economic 
development in Chechnya, what is continually missing in the official coverage of this 
issue is a frank discussion of developments in the region, such as socio-economic 
problems across the whole of the North Caucasus, and also the increasing attempt by 
the Russian authorities to clamp down on any form of unofficial Islam, be it mosques, 
Islamic schools or organisations. For the Russian government, or the Russian official 
media, to be prepared to address this issue in its fullest form is perhaps at this stage 
unlikely; nevertheless, the spread of instability into the previously stable regions in the 
North Caucasus is already happening as the clashes between militants and officials in 
Nalchik in October 2005 have shown. This may ultimately force the Russian 
government to come up with a more workable solution for the crisis than has been 
discussed up until now. 
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